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Abstract
Concerns have been raised regarding handling of Ebola virus contaminated wastewater, as
well as the adequacy of proposed disinfection approaches. In the current study, we investi-
gate the inactivation of Ebola virus in sterilized domestic wastewater utilizing sodium hypo-
chlorite addition and pH adjustment. No viral inactivation was observed in the one-hour
tests without sodium hypochlorite addition or pH adjustment. No virus was recovered after
20 seconds (i.e. 4.2 log10 unit inactivation to detection limit) following the addition of 5 and
10 mg L-1 sodium hypochlorite, which resulted in immediate free chlorine residuals of 0.52
and 1.11 mg L-1, respectively. The addition of 1 mg L-1 sodium hypochlorite resulted in an
immediate free chlorine residual of 0.16 mg L-1, which inactivated 3.5 log10 units of Ebola
virus in 20 seconds. Further inactivation was not evident due to the rapid consumption of
the chlorine residual. Elevating the pH to 11.2 was found to significantly increase viral decay
over ambient conditions. These results indicate the high susceptibility of the enveloped
Ebola virus to disinfection in the presence of free chlorine in municipal wastewater; how-
ever, we caution that extension to more complex matrices (e.g. bodily fluids) will require
additional verification.
Author Summary
Ebola virus infected individuals may generate up to nine liters of potentially infectious liq-
uid waste per day. Previous recommendations were to directly dispose of this waste into a
sanitary sewer or latrine; however, release of infectious virus raised the concern of envi-
ronmental transmission through unintentional contact with contaminated wastewater.
One possibility to reduce or eliminate the release of infectious virus is disinfection of
Ebola virus contaminated liquid waste. A hurdle to making recommendations for liquid
waste disinfection is the lack of data on disinfection efficacy. Here we demonstrate that
Ebola virus in municipal wastewater is highly sensitive to disinfection in the presence of
free chlorine. In addition, elevating the pH to 11.2 significantly increased the rate of decay
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over neutral pH conditions. These results provide a basis to develop recommendations for
the disinfection of Ebola virus contaminated wastewater.
Introduction
Ebola virus infected individuals shed the virus in bodily fluids [1–3] and may produce up to
nine liters of bodily waste per day, in addition to wash waters [4]. Subsequently, concerns
were raised during the 2014/15 Ebola virus epidemic regarding the appropriate handling of
Ebola virus contaminated wastewater to minimize potential secondary exposure to the virus
[5]. Ebola virus is an enveloped filovirus that is primarily spread via direct contact with
infected individuals [6]. Secondary transmission via environmental routes (i.e. fomites) has
previously been recognized [7], but the available evidence on environmental transmission is
controversial [8]. Previously reported concentrations of Ebola virus in bodily fluids (sweat,
urine, and stool) has been in the range of 2.8–7.2 log10 viral RNA copies mL
-1 [9–11], and 5
log10TCID50 mL
-1 in the blood of infected macaques [12]. The conversion of RNA copies to
viable virus is unknown. The median infectious dose for Ebola virus is low, in the range of
nine plaque forming units, depending on the route of infection [13].
The World Health Organization initially recommended that liquid waste from Ebola
patients be directly disposed into the sanitary sewers or latrines without disinfection [5]. The
recommendation for direct disposal of Ebola virus contaminated liquid waste was made due to
the expected rapid inactivation and dilution of Ebola virus in wastewater, as well as a lack of
evidence for Ebola virus transmission via water. Subsequently, questions were raised regarding
Ebola virus persistence in wastewater and appropriate approaches for disinfection. Research
has since identified the T90 (time for 90% inactivation) of Ebola virus in sterilized wastewater
to be 2.1 days [14], which is consistent with estimated persistence using viral surrogates [15].
Additionally, waste, including wastewater, has since been highlighted as a possible transmis-
sion risk—especially waste contaminated with infected blood [16]. Previous evaluations have
demonstrated that Ebola virus is highly stable in blood [17]. In response to the uncertainty
regarding appropriate wastewater disinfection approaches and the resulting risk of secondary
exposure or transmission, Ebola Treatment Units in the United States chose ad hoc liquid
waste disinfection approaches prior to disposal [4]. The World Health Organization ultimately
revised recommendations to suggest holding liquid waste in latrines for a week to allow viral
decay and inactivation [18].
Currently, the disinfection kinetics of Ebola virus in liquid is unknown. In a previous evalu-
ation of Ebola virus disinfection on surfaces, sodium hypochlorite at 0.01% and 0.1% was
found to be ineffective but 0.5% and 1% sodium hypochlorite removed viable virus in five
minutes [19]. Additionally, filoviruses have been previously recognized to be highly suscepti-
ble to inactivation by UV exposure [20, 21]. The pH stability of Ebola virus in wastewater is
unknown.
The overarching study goal was to determine the disinfection of Ebola virus in municipal
wastewater, of direct relevance to wastewater management in an outbreak scenario. Our scope
was limited to municipal wastewater and did not consider the disinfection of Ebola virus in
concentrated human waste (e.g. feces, vomit, or blood). It should be noted that disinfection
under high organic load (e.g. feces, vomit, or blood), which is not the focus of the current man-
uscript, would require hyper-chlorination, which has been suggested to inconsistently achieve
adequate disinfection and would require additional experimental verification [22]. In the cur-
rent study we evaluated the disinfection of Ebola virus in sterilized domestic wastewater by
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chlorine addition and pH adjustment. Study limitations as well as implications for wastewater
handling in outbreak response are discussed.
Methods
Wastewater samples were collected from a municipal wastewater treatment plant as described
previously [14] and shipped overnight on ice to Rocky Mountain Laboratories. Upon receipt,
samples were sterilized with five mega-rads of gamma irradiation and a subset of gamma-irra-
diated sample was sent back to the University of Pittsburgh for characterization and chlorine
demand analysis. Wastewater characteristics are summarized in Table 1. Sterilization was per-
formed to block microbial growth during cell culture, which would make virological analyses
impossible. Stock virus (Ebola virus Guinea Makona-WPGC07, 107.3 TCID50 mL
-1) [23] was
diluted in wastewater to achieve an approximate starting viral titer of 105 TCID50 mL
-1 for
both Ebola virus disinfection experiments and pH inactivation experiments. All experiments
were completed in triplicate at 20˚C. Ebola virus titration and cultivation were performed as
previously described [14]. The limit of detection for all replicates was 0.75 log TCID50 mL
-1.
For disinfection experiments, sodium hypochlorite (Acros Organics) was added to two mil-
liliter vials of the wastewater/virus suspension at initial doses of 0, 1, 5, and 10 mgL-1. Samples
were then taken at the indicated time points and chlorine demand immediately quenched by
the addition of sodium thiosulfate. The ‘time zero’ sampling point was taken approximately 20
seconds following the addition of chlorine to enable sample mixing.
Three pH values were evaluated for pH inactivation experiments: 6.9 (intrinsic), 4.3, and
11.2. pH values were found to be stable for the time period evaluated. The tested pH values
were chosen to be below the previously recognized Ebola virus glycoprotein stability down to
pH = 4.8 [24] and to be within the tested values for sterilization of wastewater in an outbreak
setting via elevated pH [22]. The virus was then directly added to the pH-adjusted wastewater,
mixed via pipetting, and sampled. The ‘time zero’ sampling point was taken approximately 20
seconds following the addition of virus to enable sample mixing.
Chlorine residuals in both the untreated and the gamma-irradiated wastewater were experi-
mentally determined outside of the Biosafety Level 4 facility using a Hach Free Chlorine test
kit (method 10069) in triplicate. Chlorine residual was experimentally found to be dose depen-
dent (S1 Fig). To determine the immediate chlorine demand (and residual), chlorine residual
was plotted versus time for each initial chlorine dose. A linear fit was then applied to each the
residual versus time plot for each dose, and the y-intercept (i.e. modeled initial chlorine resid-
ual) of the linear fit was determined (S2–S4 Figs). Chlorine residuals of zero were excluded
from this fit. Chlorine decay was then modeled as previously described eq (1) [25];
C ¼ C0e
  kt ð1Þ
C0 was the modeled initial chlorine residual. The concentration-time exposure was then




Chemical Oxygen Demand (mg/L) 54.7(± 3.5)
Ammonia (mg/L) 32.5 (± 2)
Total Organic Carbon (mg/L) 31.6 (± 4.3)
Total Suspended Solids (mg/L) 129 (± 9)
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005299.t001
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calculated for each sampling time point by integrating the area under the modeled chlorine
residual curve at each time point.
Statistical analyses and graphing were completed with Prism 7.0a and Microsoft Excel 2011.
Results and Discussion
To examine disinfection kinetics, chlorine residual was modeled based upon laboratory mea-
sures of free chlorine in the gamma-irradiated wastewater without viral addition. Measured
free chlorine concentrations for both the unsterilized and gamma-irradiated wastewater are
shown in Fig 1. The effect of sterilization on chlorine demand was statistically significant for
all concentrations (p< 0.05); however, the chlorine decay was more rapid in irradiated waste-
water compared to the wastewater without irradiation, suggesting that testing in the irradiated
wastewater would demonstrate less rapid viral inactivation than would be observed in the
non-irradiated wastewater at the same applied dose. Chlorine residual was found to be dose-
dependent (S1 Fig), and modeling of immediate chlorine demand in the sterilized wastewater
determined that 0, 1, 5, and 10 mg L-1 doses resulted in initial free chlorine residuals of 0, 0.16,
0.52, and 1.11 mg L-1, respectively. As Ebola virus inactivation was expected to be rapid, the
chlorine dosing conditions were selected to provide a range of representative free chlorine
concentrations while capturing inactivation kinetics of Ebola virus. The chlorine residual mea-
surements and model results are shown in S5 Fig. Concentration-time (Ct) values were then
determined by integrating the area under the chlorine residual curve at each sampling time
point.
No decay of the virus was observed for the 0 mg L-1 condition during the one-hour test. No
virus was recovered at any time point for the 5 and 10 mg L-1 chlorine from the 105 TCID50
mL-1 starting virus concentration (maximum observable reduction 4.18 log10 TCID50 mL
-1).
Data for the 0 and 1 mg L-1 conditions from the 105 TCID50 mL
-1 virus concentration is
shown in Fig 2 and S1 Table. Following an initially rapid viral inactivation (approximately 3.5
log10 TCID50 mL
-1 in 20 seconds), no further viral removal was observed in the 1 mg/L condi-
tion, likely due to the low concentration of free chlorine (S5 Fig).
Observed viral inactivation versus calculated Ct is shown in Fig 3. For demonstration, val-
ues are plotted at the limit of viral detection for the 5 mg L-1 and 10 mg L-1 dosing conditions,
although no virus was recovered. The most persistent observed inactivation to achieve four
log10 units of Ebola virus removal was equivalent to 1.1 mg-min L
-1. The current US EPA rec-
ommendation to achieve four logs of virus removal in drinking water at the tested conditions
Fig 1. Free chlorine concentration in sterilized (gamma-irradiated) wastewater (A) and wastewater (B) over four
time points (2, 10, 20 and 60 minutes) for initial doses of 0, 1, 5, and 10 mgL-1 sodium hypochlorite. Error bars
represent the standard deviation calculated from three replicates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005299.g001
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is 3 mg-min L-1 of free chlorine [26]. These results demonstrate that requirements for Ebola
virus disinfection would be expected to be at three-fold below current standards for virus dis-
infection in water; however, the chlorine demand of the wastewater being disinfected must
first be exceeded for this recommendation to be valid.
It was noted that Ebola virus from later time points in the 1 mg L-1 experiment appear to be
more resistant based upon calculated Ct values than would be estimated by initial Ebola virus
disinfection time points or observed removal at the 5 and 10 mg L-1 doses. This observed
Fig 2. Disinfection of Ebola virus at 0 and 1 mg/L added chlorine. No virus was recovered from the 5 and 10
mg/L chlorine conditions at any time point. The limit of detection was 0.75 log TCID50/mL. Error bars represent one
standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005299.g002
Fig 3. Log viral removal versus estimated Ct. Viral removal for 5 and 10 mg L-1 chlorine conditions shown at
detection limit for demonstration purposes. Dashed line represents limit of detection. The limit of detection was 0.75 log
TCID50 mL-1, resulting in a maximum observable log10 TCID50 removal of 4.18 TCID50 mL-1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005299.g003
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persistence effect may be due to multiple factors, such as particle association or aggregation of
the virus providing some protection from disinfection [27, 28] or incomplete mixing of the
added chlorine and rapid consumption of the available free chlorine residual. Alternatively,
there may potentially be a ‘persistent’ Ebola virus population that may be more disinfectant
resistant. Finally, there may have been a more rapid decay of the chlorine residual than mod-
eled (perhaps due to the chlorine demand of the viral suspension).
We also investigated Ebola virus inactivation via pH adjustment. Results are shown in Fig 4
and S2 Table. No viral inactivation was observed within the test period at the ambient waste-
water pH of 6.9. No statistically significant inactivation was observed at pH 4.3. At pH 11.2
and with a 105 TCID50 mL
-1 starting virus concentration, the 95% confidence interval for one
log inactivation was found to be 52 to 193 minutes.
Limitations
The current study has multiple limitations. The wastewater was required to be disinfected by
gamma irradiation to avoid bacterial contamination and toxicity of the cell culture line. This
irradiation resulted in an increased chlorine demand by the wastewater and may have altered
other wastewater chemistry. Additionally, chlorine residual modeling was performed based
upon laboratory tests using solely the gamma-irradiated wastewater. The virus to be disin-
fected was suspended in cell culture media—while the virus suspension comprised less than
1% of the test matrix, this has the potential to alter the chlorine demand of the test. We note
that in this case, the observed viral persistence would be conservative, i.e. the actual Ct would
in fact be less than the modeled Ct for the evaluated conditions and viral inactivation would be
more rapid than reported. Due to the dilute nature of the wastewater evaluated, the role of
higher organic loading and particle association in protecting virus from disinfection remains
unresolved, although recent studies using Ebola virus surrogates have suggested that the
majority (~90%) of viral particles remain not particle associated [29, 30].
Implications
Despite the end of the most recent Ebola virus epidemic, concerns remain regarding the
potential transmission of emerging enveloped viruses via water [31], highlighting the value of
Fig 4. Ebola virus persistence in wastewater at neutral (6.9), acidic (4.3), and basic (11.2) pH. The limit
of detection was 0.75 log TCID50 mL-1. Error bars represent one standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0005299.g004
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continued investigation into enveloped virus persistence and disinfection. These results dem-
onstrate the high susceptibility of Ebola virus to disinfection in the presence of free chlorine.
The most conservative estimate for Ebola virus disinfection was less than current recommen-
dations for waterborne virus inactivation, suggesting that existing disinfection approaches are
adequate to achieve Ebola virus reductions in wastewater. In addition, elevated pH would pro-
vide significantly improved viral inactivation over ambient decay. These results highlight the
value of considering wastewater disinfection in response to infectious disease outbreaks to
minimize the risk of secondary transmission, as well as to address public concern.
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